Competition with Variety Seeking and Habitual Consumption: Price Commitment or Quality Commitment?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price Competition in Markets with Consumer Variety Seeking
We show that the non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-period duopoly with consumer variety-seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety-seeking. Specifically, our variety-seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in both periods, and not just in the second period only as in the switching-cost model of Klemperer (1987a, 1987b), which...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1024-123X,1563-5147
DOI: 10.1155/2017/9845651