Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modeling loan commitments ✩
Loan commitments represent more than 82 percent of all commercial and industrial loans by domestic banks. This paper develops a valuation model for loan commitments incorporating early exercise, multiple fees, partial exercise and credit risk. The model is analytically tractable and easy to implement. Using a sample of commercial paper backup credit lines from the Dealscan database, we show tha...
متن کاملLoan Commitments and the Debt Overhang Problem
The debt overhang problem is shown to arise in the context of an entrepreneurial project that requires a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender. The entrepreneur, not internalizing losses accruing to the lender which financed the initial investments, may inefficiently cancel the project and instead pursue an outside opportunity. It is shown that loan commitments (contracts that a...
متن کاملRelationship Banking, Loan Specialization and Competition
While competition constrains the ability of banks to extract informational rents from lending relationships, their informational monopoly also curtails competition through the threat of adverse selection. To analyze an intermediary’s optimal strategic response to these opposing effects we specify a model where the severity of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers increases with inf...
متن کاملBank Capital Ratios, Competition and Loan Spreads
This paper empirically investigates whether or not banks charge higher loan spreads for having high capital ratios by using a dataset of all syndicated loans issued by public nonfinancial U.S. borrowers during the 1993 to 2007 period. We find convincing evidence that well-capitalized banks can indeed charge a ’spread premium’. We further investigate whether this result can be explained by banks...
متن کاملAsymmetric Information: the Case of Bank Loan Commitments
This study analyzes common stock return behavior around the announcement date of a bank loan commitment to a firm. The results demonstrate that loan commitments are viewed as positive when the more formal revolving credit agreement is used. Straight lines of credit do not show any significant reaction. Loan commitment announcements are associated with signals transmitted by banks and is an impl...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/0378-4266(87)90043-4