Competition or collusion? Negotiating discounts off posted prices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Filling Seats at a Theater: Estimating the Impact of Posted Prices and Dynamic Discounts
Applying revenue management techniques for the entertainment industries, such as theaters, faces several specific challenges. Many theaters increase their audience and revenues through promotional discounts and pricing strategies based on the quality of the seats. Due to the varying quality of shows, and the high availability of seats, many customers purchase tickets or postpone their purchases...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.05.003