Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.230