Competition Law as an Instrument of Protectionist Policy: Comparative Analysis of the EU and the US

Today, there is a growing fear of resurfacing protectionism, from United States’ trade-war with China, to UK’s Brexit, the less known trade-restricting measures adopted by countries globally. The General Agreement on Trade & Tariff (GATT), superseded World Organisation (WTO) since 1995, rendered classic forms protectionism such as tariffs obsolete. However, it did not defeat protectionism; instead, has evolved through its protean capacity adapt into new and often undetectable forms, now labelled ‘murky’ (e.g. competition law enforcement recent bailout packages). It argued that are two ways in which States can utilise impair free-trade restrict foreign firms’ access domestic markets: exemption certain anticompetitive conduct under national strategic application law. This article considers an instrument protectionist policy comparative analysis US European Union. Using international political economy (IPE) perspective underpinned overlapping theories (legal/political) realism, this establishes that, while no direct robust empirical evidence motivations exists, particularly ‘merger regulation export cartel exemptions’, presence elements decision-making, wide discretion granted authorities ‘sponge’ nature present opportunity for use tendencies.