منابع مشابه
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a ``natural experiment'' causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue and compare bidder surplus before and after the auction....
متن کاملCompetition in Austrian Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a “natural experiment” causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders caused a significant drop in the yields Austria had to pay for newly issued debt. We use structural...
متن کاملDo Bidders in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions Have Private Values?∗
We exploit a unique feature of data from Canadian treasury bill auctions, in which some bidders have information about rivals’ bids, to develop a test if values are private. Information about a rival’s bid causes a bidder to bid differently when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals’ information. In a divisible good setting, such as treasury bill auctions, bidders with p...
متن کاملValuing Dealers’ Informational Advantage: A Study of Canadian Treasury Auctions∗
In many financial markets, dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers. To quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage, we study detailed data from Canadian treasury auctions, where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids. In this setting, dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about (i) competition, i.e. th...
متن کاملThe Effect of Auctions on Daily Treasury-bill Volatility
We investigate the Treasury bill (T-bill) market for volatility effects, and especially any volatility introduced by the T-bill auction process. We use daily T-bill yields for on-therun 13-, 26-, and 52-week T-bills from January 1983 through December 2000. We find that T-bill volatility is not constant across a run, hence is not consistent with the Treasury's auction process intent of a stable ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039