Competition and cooperation in mutual fund families
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Predation versus Cooperation in Mutual Fund Families
In this paper we investigate how mutual funds react to the distress of another fund in the same fund family. We test three alternative hypotheses: (1) funds help the distressed fund, (2) funds front-run the distressed fund improving their relative performance in the fund family and, (3) the family coordinates and benefits from front-running the distressed fund. Our results suggest that fund man...
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We study how competition in the mutual fund industry affects the stock market and its liquidity. We argue that mutual fund families operate as multi-product firms, jointly choosing fees, performance and number of funds. We show that competition between fund families distorts the incentives to collect information and induces the families to trade off performance and number of funds. An increase ...
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Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds’ investment restrictions, and governance mechanisms influence the fund family’s decision to apply for interfund lending. We document several costs ...
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Mutual fund investors desire high risk-adjusted performance at low cost, which may not necessarily be the objective of fund families. Fund families want to maximize assets under management (i.e., their market share) and the resulting management fees. This paper studies the extent to which conflicts of interest are mitigated by competition in the mutual fund industry using the universe of U.S. m...
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This paper analyzes competition between mutual funds in a multiple funds version of the model of Hugonnier and Kaniel (2010). We characterize the set of equilibria for this portfolio management game and show that there exists a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium. The main result of this paper shows that the funds cannot differentiate themselves through portfolio choice in the sense that they sho...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0304-405X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.09.004