Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game
Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest le...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review E
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1539-3755,1550-2376
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.92.012819