منابع مشابه
Competition amongst Contests
This article analyses the optimal allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models on contest design take the set of participants as being exogenously given, in our model contests compete for participants. Our analysis provides a new argument for the widespread occurrence of prizes that reward suboptimal performance. Moreover, we identify a negative relationship between a contest’s predi...
متن کاملWithin-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in Contests∗
Olson’s analysis argues that the free-rider problem makes large groups less effective. In this paper, we challenge this view of group action with a very simple contest game that exhibits a bilateral interplay between intergroup interaction and within-group organization. In a static setting, because of the free-riding incentives, the larger group is disadvantaged in the competition with its riva...
متن کاملTwo-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
Models of party competition building on Downs (1957) have recognized that there are centrifugal and centripetal forces in party competition; but one such force, the existence of party primaries, has been remarkably neglected in recent literature. We consider party/candidate policy divergence in two-party competition in one dimension where there is a two-stage electoral process, e.g., a primary ...
متن کاملImpulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests
Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in rentseeking contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Through an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanati...
متن کاملDynamic Contests
Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tugof-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency ghts) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement e¤ect. This e¤ect explains why the sum of rent-seeking e¤orts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent conict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peaceful int...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1107792