Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A note on Peters and Severinov, "Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices"
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71 84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica 61 (1993), 12...
متن کاملAnalyzing competition among sellers in a B2B exchange
Business-to-business exchanges are expected to bring several advantages to the participants of the exchange. One of the principal advantages of such exchanges lies in their promise of lowering prices for buyers due to increased competition among the sellers for the buyers’ business. This paper models the competition between similar sellers vying for the same business by bidding on price. It cap...
متن کاملWhen Should Sellers Use Auctions?
When it is costly to participate in the sale of an asset, potential buyers typically submit offers either simultaneously, as in an auction, or sequentially, so that later potential entrants may observe previous bids. We show in an IPV setting that when the entry process is selective, so that buyers with higher values are more likely to enter, both sellers and buyers generally prefer the sequent...
متن کاملCompetition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a ``natural experiment'' causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue and compare bidder surplus before and after the auction....
متن کاملBidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset’s realized value. In formal security-bid auctions, the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a standard auction format (e.g., first or secondprice). In informal settings, bidders offer arbitrary securities and the seller chooses the...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.5.1806