Competing Combinatorial Auctions

نویسندگان

چکیده

Combinatorial auctions are in which bids can be submitted on sets of items, rather than just individual items. These generally beneficial to both auctioneers and bidders, as they allow bidders express their synergies for In recent years, we have seen the advent combinatorial well emergence online market platforms with competing auctioneers. However, largely been absent from these platforms. Our article provides an explanation this absence by demonstrating that competition between reduce attractiveness offering auctions. Specifically, show limit competitive pressure themselves allowing only specific packages, where packages differ This results segmentation, increases bidder competition, consequently auctioneer revenues. findings implications design. particular imply that, platform having multiple sellers same set buyers, it might not advantageous offer a design option sellers.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Information Systems Research

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1047-7047', '1526-5536']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.1018