منابع مشابه
Competing Auctions
This paper shows that larger auctions are more ef cient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identicalmarkets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We nd that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer–seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
متن کاملCompeting intermediary auctions
Bidders’ selection of an auction is important in the study of competing auctioneers. However, in a variety of settings, such as in the spot pricing of online display advertisements, bidders, represented by autonomous agents, are not allowed to bid directly but only via specialized intermediaries. Motivated by the emergence of these markets, we analyze a scenario where a single indivisible good ...
متن کاملCompeting Auctions with Endogenous Quantities1
Two sellers decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a nite number of buyers with unit demand and privately known valuations. In the rst model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers decide where to bid. Using the theory of potential games, we show that...
متن کاملCompeting auctions with endogenous quantities
We study models where two sellers simultaneously decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a nite, not necessarily large, number of buyers who have unit demand and privately known valuations. In the rst model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second model, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers...
متن کاملEffi cient Entry in Competing Auctions ∗
In this paper, we demonstrate the effi ciency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing effi ciency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information. ∗We thank Andrzej Skrzypacz, our editor, and Jeremy Bulow for their help...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774
DOI: 10.1162/154247604323015472