Competent uses of competence: on the difference between a value-judgment and empirical assessability

This article considers the concept of Competence as applied to educational theory and policy, illuminates possibility significant variations in meaning. Referring Wittgenstein’s distinctions between transitive intransitive uses notions Holland’s description mastery, argues favour two senses which someone can be described being competent: i) expressive a value judgment; ii) pointing person’s (formal) qualifications. While latter opens path towards different forms measurements competence, competent judgment eludes any such treatment. Making this distinction, it is argued that competence less illuminative theoretical term than, for example, pair concepts Bildung versus Ausbildung ((self-)subjectivation vs training), has been used Continental tradition order describe similar distinction. With examples from contexts, demonstrates moment using one word meanings, central distinction education either concealed or forgotten. Focusing on purely an empirically assessable notion risks playing into hands instrumentalising education.