Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium And Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case*
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium and Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case
Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. Recent work on nonconvex exchange economies has shown that when the randomizing device is a continuous random variable, applying the two concepts to the same fundamental economy yields the same set of equilibrium allocations. In the present paper, we examine economies based on a discret...
متن کاملComparing Sunspot Equilibrium and Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: the Finite Case∗ by Rod Garratt,
Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. We compare these concepts in a class of completely finite, (possibly) nonconvex exchange economies with perfect markets, which requires extending the lottery model to the finite case. Every equilibrium allocation of our lottery model is also a sunspot equilibrium allocation. The convers...
متن کاملComparing Sunspot Equilibrium and Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: the Finite Case by Rod Garratt, Todd Keister, and Karl Shell
Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. Recent work by Garratt, Keister, Qin, and Shell (in press) and Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (in press) on nonconvex exchange economies has shown that when the randomizing device is continuous, applying the two concepts to the same fundamental economy yields the same set of equilibrium al...
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Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we generalize the results of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show | using the technique of iterated elimination of domi...
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We consider a notion of voluntary participation for mechanism design in public goods economies in which mechanisms select public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations that are robust to non-participation is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and may shrink to the endow...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00129.x