Comparative Risk Aversion in the Presence of Ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
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15 صفحه اولGender Differences in Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion
Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion This paper demonstrates gender differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. It also contributes to a growing literature relating economic preference parameters to psychological measures by asking whether variations in preference parameters among persons, and in particular across genders, can be accounted for by differences in pe...
متن کاملAmbiguity Aversion , Comparative Ignorance , and Decision Context
People typically find bets less attractive when the probability of receiving a prize is more vague or ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961). According to Fox & Tverskys (1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis, ambiguity aversion is driven by the comparison with more familiar events or more knowledgeable individuals, and diminishes or disappears in the absence of such a comparison. In this paper we emphas...
متن کاملAmbiguity and Ambiguity Aversion
Consider the following choice problem, known as “Ellsberg’s three-color urn example”, or simply the “Ellsberg Paradox” (Ellsberg [7]). An urn contains 30 red balls, and 60 green and blue balls, in unspecified proportions; subjects are asked to compare (i) a bet on a red draw vs. a bet on a green draw, and (ii) a bet on a red or blue draw vs. a bet on a green or blue draw. If the subject wins a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150056