Company Performance in Nigerian Listed Companies: Do Large Shareholders Expropriate Minority Shareholders?

Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

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Large shareholders and accounting research

Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms’ corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost argumen...

Beyond the Biggest: Do Other Large Shareholders Influence Corporate Valuations?

This paper examines the relationship between corporate valuations and the presence, size, incentives, and identity of multiple large shareholders. Using data on a large number of firms across Western Europe, we find that about one-third of all firms, and over 40 percent of firms with one large owner, have two or more owners that each holds more than 10 percent of the voting rights. We find that...

Minority shareholders’ protection in Romanian capital markets: evidence on dividends

Recent studies in Finance suggest dividends’ role as monitoring mechanism, which allows minority shareholders to control the managers or larger shareholders’ decisions. This paper tests this hypothesis on listed companies at Bucharest Stock Exchange, in 2000-2003 period, from the legislation perspective, but, also, using dividend ratios. Even the regulations and the enforcement of the law seem ...

Shareholders’ Pre-Emptive Rights