Common knowledge promotes risk pooling in an experimental economic game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLOS ONE
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0220682