Common External Tariff Choice in Core Customs Unions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Toward a North American customs union: Rules of origin liberalization matters more than a common external tariff for Canada
This paper shows that the general equilibrium impacts on Canadian GDPandwelfare, of liberalizingNAFTARulesofOrigin (ROO), largely dominate the small effects of adopting a Common North American External Tariff (CET). Therefore, proposals for a North American CU should not be dismissed solely on the basis that a CET would marginally affect Canada while the negotiation process with the U.S. would ...
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Froposition. Ccnsiaer any competitive world trading ewilibrium, with any number of countries and commodities, and with no restrictions whatever on the tariffs and other commodity taxes of individual countries, and with costs of transport fully recognized. Now let any subset of the countries form a customs unton. Then there exists a common tartrvector and a system of lump-sum compensatory paymen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0965-7576,1467-9396
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2009.00824.x