Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designers simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated with equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria relative to (some subset of) the set of menus. Furthermore, equilibria relative to the set of menus are weak...
متن کاملThe Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle – what we term the “delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria. JEL Classification: D82, L51.
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The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second...
متن کاملNotes on the Revelation Principle
This set of lecture notes covers a general model of adverse selection as well as a leading example that of a price discriminating monopolist due to Maskin and Riley (1984). At the end of this unit, students should understand the application of the revelation principal to this class of models, the general solution techniques, and the key economic trade-o¤ e¢ ciency versus information rent sav...
متن کاملThe revelation principle and regularity conditions
The revelation principle asserts that every outcome brought by a mechanism is realized by a truthful direct mechanism. The present paper investigates the regularity conditions of these two mechanisms in the continuous space of the agent’s type. It questions what regularity condition a general mechanism confers upon a direct mechanism through the revelation principle. By so doing, we elucidate t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00245