Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions
The transition of the advertisement market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions used to sell advertisement space on the web. We analyze how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency undermines both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microso...
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This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that Yahoo operates to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that weak dominance arguments do not in general select a unique Nash equilibrium. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers...
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This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze ...
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In sponsored search auctions advertisers typically pay a fixed amount per click that their advertisements receive. In particular, the advertiser and the publisher enter into a contract (e.g., the publisher displays the ad; the advertiser pays the publisher 10 cents per click), and each party’s subjective value for such a contract depends on their estimated click-through rates (CTR) for the ad. ...
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Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. In such an auction, a set of utility-maximizing advertisers compete for a set of ad slots. The assignment of advertisers to slots depends on bids they submit; these bids may be different than the true valuations of the advertisers for the slots. Variants of the celebrated VCG auction mechanism guarantee that advertiser...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2336393