Committees and Special Interests

Connicts and Common Interests in Committees Suny at Buualo

Committees improve decisions by pooling independent information of members, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have con icting preferences. When members' preferences di er, the report submitted by any individual can not allow perfect inference of his private information. Equilibrium outcomes transform continuous data into ordered ranks: v...

Update on special interests and focused practices.

Electoral concerns, special interests and illegal immigration

In 2006 illegal immigrants represented four percent of the total number of US residents, and comparable figures hold also for other advanced destination countries. If governments are not able or willing to stick to their “official” immigration policy, why do they set such policies in the first place? The purpose of this paper is to address this apparent puzzle, by developing a political agency ...

How Special Interests Shape Policy A Survey

This paper surveys recent approaches towards lobbying if interest groups influence the decision of an incumbent government. It describes the two main channels of influence which mainly exist in parallel, namely contribution payments and the transmission of information through lobbying. Recent extensions to the two basic lobbying models are discussed in great detail. Thereafter follows a short o...

Federal government food policy committees and the financial interests of the food sector

Norm Campbell, MD, is a Professor in the Departments of Medicine, Physiology and Pharmacology, and Community Health Sciences, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta. He was on the steering committee of and was a member of the Sodium Working Group of Health Canada, and is a member of the sodium subgroup of the Food Expert Advisory Committee of Health Canada. Kevin J. Willis, PhD, is Executive D...