منابع مشابه
Comment on “ Commitment Vs . Flexibility ”
This comment corrects two results in the 2006 Econometrica paper by Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (AWA), that features a model in which individuals face a tradeoff between flexibility and commitment. First, in contrast to Proposition 1 in AWA, we show that money-burning can be part of the ex ante optimal contract when there are two states. Second, in contrast to Proposition 2 in AWA, we show t...
متن کاملTo “ Comment on ‘ Commitment Vs . Flexibility ’ ” (
IN THE APPENDIX of Ambrus and Egorov (2013), the proof of Proposition 3 contained only the idea of proof of the result that w(θp) < z(u(θp)) is possible, so money-burning for high types is possible. Here, we present the complete proof of this fact. Our strategy is to build on Example 1, approximate it with a continuous distribution, and show that, for sufficiently close approximations, the opti...
متن کاملCommitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification
A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased towards higher actions. She chooses whether to audit the agent’s information and his permissible actions. We show that if the audit cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent can select any action below a threshold, or request audit and the efficient action if the threshold is sufficiently bind...
متن کاملA Comment on Commitment and Flexibility∗
This comment corrects two results in the 2006 Econometrica paper by Amador, Werning and Angeletos (AWA), that features a model in which individuals face a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. First, in contrast to Proposition 1 in AWA, we show that money-burning can be part of the ex ante optimal contract when there are two states. Second, in contrast to Proposition 2 in AWA, we show t...
متن کاملInvestigating commitment flexibility in multi-agent contracts
Reputation and commitment are important issues for automated contracting. Levelled commitment contracts, i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty, were introduced to allow self interested agents to accommodate events that unfolded since the contract was entered into. Various approaches to modelling reputation have been explored, allowing an agent to make de...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.471822