منابع مشابه
Commitment in First-Price Auctions
We study a variation of the single-item sealed-bid first-price auction wherein one bidder (the leader) publicly commits to a strategy before the others submit their bids. We fully characterize the committed mixed strategy that is optimal for the leader, and find that the leader and the follower with the highest valuation strictly benefit from the commitment. We further show that compared with t...
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I consider an independent private values auction environment with risk–neutral buyers and an either risk–neutral or risk–averse seller. My setting differs from standard settings in two respects. First, the seller does not know his reservation value at the time he designs the auction, and second, he cannot commit to selling after observing the outcome of the auction. For general distributions of...
متن کاملRepeated First-Price Auctions
We study a model of two-round, rst-price, sealed bid auctions with two bidders and two identical items. We assume that both bidders want to purchase both items and the bidders valuation for the object remains the same in both rounds. After the conclusion of the rst round, the winner and the winning bid are publicly announced. The bidders use this information to update their beliefs about the...
متن کاملAsymmetric first price auctions
We propose a new approach to asymmetric rst price auctions which circumvents having to directly examine bidding strategies. Speci cally, the ratio of bidderspayo¤s is compared to the ratio of the distribution functions that describe beliefs. This comparison allows a number of easy inferences. In the existing theoretical literature, assumptions of rst order stochastic dominance or stronger im...
متن کاملFirst-Price Procurement Auctions
We study markets in which an auctioneer wishes to assemble a team of agents to accomplish some task. These agents offer fixed services that incur some privately known cost. The auctioneer must select a team, or feasible set of agents, that is capable of performing the task. To this end, he designs a procurement auction in which he solicits bids from the agents and then selects some feasible set...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1069-5