Commitment and observability in games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Experimental Study of Commitment and Observability in Stackelberg Games
We report on experiments examining the value of commitment in Stackelberg games where the follower chooses whether to pay some cost ε to perfectly observe the leader’s action. Várdy (2001) shows that in the unique ∗Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. †CERAS, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 75343 Paris cedex 07. Corresponding auth...
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This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leadersactions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leadersactions, i.e. they are not accessible. Access...
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Bagwell (GEB, 1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest amount of imperfect observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (GEB, 1998) question this assertion: for any finite leaderfollower game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoffs, they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome which is accessible. That is, this outcome can be ...
متن کاملCommitment games
This paper explores how the ability to commit in games affect equilibrium payoffs. More precisely, we consider two-stage games, called commitment games, in which players can commit to some of their strategies in the first stage, and play the game induced by their commitment in the second stage. We completely characterize equilibrium payoffs of commitment games. Among others, we show that the po...
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An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an agent who has different pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose and which ones to conceal, and a principal chooses an action (a “reward”). The agent’s preference is the same regardless of his information (his “type”)—he always prefers the reward to be as high as possible—whereas the principal prefers the reward to ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80001-6