Commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry Deterrence in Durable-Goods Monopoly∗
There are industries that tend to remain monopolized, with successive generations of a good being introduced by an incumbent monopolist. This paper investigates the tendency of persistent leadership in durable goods industry. In particular it explores the implications of the durability of a good on the pricing and innovation behavior of both the incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant. It ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(86)90016-0