منابع مشابه
Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic”rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit by accumulating illiquid assets. We introduce politicians who may indulge/exploit voters’behavioral biases. Three main insights emerge: (i) Individuals’attempts to privately undo the consequences...
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Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the govern...
متن کاملThe Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects
We study whether and why voters may choose inefficient policies and institutions. We show that a majority of subjects in an experiment vote against policies that would help them overcome social dilemmas. This is due to their failure to fully anticipate the equilibrium effects of new policies. More precisely, subjects systematically underappreciate the extent to which policy changes affect other...
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*Ishikawa: Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan. Fax: +81-(0)42-580-8882; E-mail: [email protected]. Sugita: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Tel: +46-8-736-9254; Email: [email protected]. Zhao: RIEB, Kobe University, Kobe 657-8501, Japan. Fax/Tel: +81-78-803-7006; E-mail: [email protected]. We than...
متن کاملFor Online Publication: Appendix for Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
In this supplementary appendix, we study various extensions of the model in the paper. More specifically, in Section A we allow for election in the first period; in Section B we study the setting with arbitrary number of periods and convex distortions discussed in the body of the paper; in Section C we analyze a model analogous to the one presented in the paper in which agents are characterized...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/344804