Comment to „Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten?” (“Do Remuneration Schemes Reduce Agency Costs?”)
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure
The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure re ects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani-Miller), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen-Meckling). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is relatively small for the range of envi...
متن کاملNegative agency costs
Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed to benefit from a market power in terms of external funding opportunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, ...
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We investigate the agency costs of corporate ownership structure and the role of audit committees in mitigating their effect. Using China as a laboratory, where audit committees are voluntary, we study the demand for and value relevance of audit committees conditional on the various agency costs of corporate ownership. Audit committees complement existing internal governance systems by reducing...
متن کاملWealth effects and agency costs
We analyze how the agent’s initial wealth affects the principal’s expected profits in the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard. We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent’s utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coe...
متن کاملAgency Costs and Ownership Structure
We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm’s sole shareholder. Utilizing a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database, we find evidence supporting several predictions of agency cost theo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0340-1707,1861-1559
DOI: 10.3790/vjh.70.2.247