Combinatorial auction design

Combinatorial auction design.

Combinatorial auctions allow for more expressive bidding in which participants can submit package bids with logical constraints that limit allowable outcomes. This type of auction can be useful when participants' values are complementary or when participants have production and financial constraints. However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems confronted in...

False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition

This paper proposes a new approach to building falsename-proof (FNP) combinatorial auctions from those that are FNP only with single-minded bidders, each of whom requires only one particular bundle. Under this approach, a general bidder is decomposed into a set of single-minded bidders, and after the decomposition the price and the allocation are determined by the FNP auctions for single-minded...

Choosing a Combinatorial Auction Design: An Illustrated Example

This paper summarizes a talk given in honor of Saul Gass’ 80 Birthday celebration. The paper is modeled after Saul’s well-known book An Illustrated Guide to Linear Programming and presents some of the illustrations provided during that talk. In this paper, we explain why specific rules might be chosen within a general combinatorial auction framework. The purpose of such rules is to assure that ...

Truthful Combinatorial Double Auction For Combinatorial Exchanges

First-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheme is used for selling the goods in market that is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In earlier literature it has been shown that the auction based alternative solutions using the framework of mechanism design, a sub field of game theory [18] can provide better results against FCFS in...

Restricted Truthful Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms