Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality

We consider the problem of a fair collective choice function (fair CCF) which maps each profile of extended preference orderings into the set of fair social states (the set consists of alternatives which are both Pareto efficient and envy-free) when such a set exists. Our main objective is to examine compatibility of fair social choices with collective rationality. We formulate desirable proper...

Cooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies ∗

We endogenize social network formation and social interaction using a model in which players interact bilaterally and repeatedly along costly links. Cooperation is supported by the threat of collective punishment. When the society is homogeneous, the optimal network consists of many separate cliques. Introducing heterogeneity gives rise to more realistic networks, with high clustering, small di...

When Can Splits be Drawn in the Plane?

Split networks are a popular tool for the analysis and visualization of complex evolutionary histories. Every collection of splits (bipartitions) of a finite set can be represented by a split network. Here we characterize which collection of splits can be represented using a planar split network. Our main theorem links these collections of splits with oriented matroids and arrangements of lines...

Optimal Incentive Contracts When Workers Envy Their Boss

A worker’s utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer’s income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper employs a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under various assumptions about the object a...

Ageing societies and challenges for collective bargaining policy