Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

Collective Reputation and Quality

Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub-optimal for the group. These results support minimum quality st...

Individual and Collective Reputation Indicators of Wine Quality

Recommending a minimum English proficiency standard for entry-level nursing.

When nurses who are educated internationally immigrate to the United States, they are expected to have English language proficiency in order to function as a competent nurse. The purpose of this research was to provide sufficient information to the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) to make a defensible recommended passing standard for English proficiency. This standard was bas...

Collective Reputation, Professional Regulation and Franchising

Collective reputation and its associated free-rider problem have been invoked to justify state licensing of professions and to explain the incidence of franchising. We examine the conditions under which it is possible to create a Pareto-improving collective reputation among groups of heterogeneous producers. If the regulator or franchisor cannot credibly commit to high quality then a common rep...

Reputation for Quality∗

We propose a new model of firm reputation where product quality is persistent and determined by the firm’s past investments. Reputation is then modeled directly as the market belief about quality. We analyze how investment incentives depend on the firm’s reputation and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When con...