Collective Intentionality and Social Organization

Collective intentionality and the social status of artifactual kinds

There is a well-developed view of artifacts according to which their nature depends on the intentions of their authors or creators. However, in the modern world of artifact design and creation, typically not one but many agents are involved in the process of making an artifact. In this paper, I showhow the intentional view can bemaintained even for ‘collective’ artifacts havingmultiple authors....

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117-147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264-265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165-181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bac...

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Differential social organization, collective action, and crime

This article elaborates and extends Sutherland’s [Principles of criminology (4th ed.), Lippincott, Philadelphia, Sutherland (1947)] concept of differential social organization, the sociological counterpart to his social psychological theory of differential association. Differential social organization contains a static structural component, which explains crime rates across groups, as well as a...

Wittgenstein running: neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode.

In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie "we-mode" processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potent...