Collateral, Default Penalties and Infinite Horizon Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collateral, default penalties and infinite horizon equilibrium
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) noticed that when collateralized promises become subject to utility penalties on default, Ponzi schemes may occur. However, equilibrium exists in some interesting cases. Under low penalties, equilibrium exists if the collateral does not yield utility (for example, when it is a productive asset or a security). Equilibrium exists also under more severe penalties and colla...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2103526