منابع مشابه
When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers
We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that margins-based Condorcet methods can elect a Condorcet Loser with non-zero probibility when voters vote tactica...
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Communitarianism is the thesis that it is ultimately the dispositions of a community of speakers that determine the content of a symbol. Boghossian‟s reasons for rejecting this theory turn on the fact that he sees the account as unable to accommodate the normativity of meaning, i.e. the fact that the content of a symbol must exclude parts of the world (application of the symbol to which would t...
متن کاملMaximal Condorcet Domains
A Condorcet domain is a subset of the set of linear orders on a finite set of candidates (alternatives to vote), such that if voters preferences are linear orders belonging to such a subset, then the simple majority rule does not yield cycles. It is well-known that the set of linear orders LO is the Bruhat lattice. We prove that a maximal Condorcet domain is a distributive sublattice in the Bru...
متن کاملCondorcet winning sets
Analternative is said to be aCondorcetwinner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any ...
متن کاملThe Condorcet paradox revisited
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents’ risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one. Equilibria are generically unique, Pareto effici...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1079-z