Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
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Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
". . . professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.5.1737