Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s code-of-conduct, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information we are able to prove a “folk-like” theorem f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2