Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions

The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We characterize this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose new semantics for a...

Stable coalitions in a continuous-time model of risk sharing

In an economy with a continuum of individuals, each individual has a stochastic, continuously evolving endowment process. Individuals are risk-averse and would therefore like to insure their endowment processes. It is feasible to obtain insurance by pooling endowments across individuals because the processes are mutually independent. We characterize the payoff from an insurance contracting sche...

Risk Sharing, Investment, and Incentives in the Neoclassical Growth Model

T he amount of risk sharing among households, regions, or countries is crucial in determining aggregate welfare. For example, pooling resources at the national level can help regions better deal with natural disasters like floods. Similarly, pooling resources with an insurance company can help individuals deal with shocks like a house fire or a car accident. Capital accumulation and economic gr...

Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium

Impact of Collusion and Coalitions in RISK

Collusion is an agreement between multiple players to conspire against other player(s), yielding higher payoffs than they would get on their own. In a large variety of games, collusion is considered cheating such as in bridge and poker, due to the unfair advantage players receive by revealing key bits of information. Generally, colluding agents are expected to maximize their actions through a r...