Coalitions for Change

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چکیده

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منابع مشابه

Description logic for coalitions

Coalition Logic (CL) is one of the most important formalisms for specification and verification of game-like multi-agent systems. Several extensions of the logic have been studied in the literature. These extensions are usually fusions (independent joins) of CL with other modal logics (e.g., temporal, epistemic, dynamic, etc.), and they are generally propositional. In this paper, we propose a g...

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Forming Coalitions for Breaking Deadlocks

When multiple agents solve their own problems while they interact with each other, it is helpful to form a coalition, which is a group of agents working together. Previous approaches to coalition formation have proposed to de ne the utility of coalitions and to use a strategy that agents form coalitions for getting higher utility. However, in some problems, the utility of coalitions is not easi...

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Social Viewpoints for Arguing about Coalitions

Frameworks for arguing about coalitions are based on non-monotonic logic and are therefore formal and abstract, whereas social theories about agent coalitions typically are based on conceptual modeling languages and therefore semi-formal and detailed. In this paper we bridge the gap between these two research areas such that social viewpoints can be used to argue about coalitions. We formally d...

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Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions

The aggregation of individuals’ preferences into a single group outcome is both well-studied and fundamental within decision theory. Historically, though, a pervasive simplification has been to strip agents of the ability to form coalitions and strategically reveal their intentions. CP techniques can address such possibilities within a restricted socialchoice framework that represents mechanism...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: International Studies Review

سال: 1998

ISSN: 2667-0836,2667-078X

DOI: 10.1163/2667078x-00202001