Coalitional Game Framework for Content Distribution Using Device-to-Device <?brk?>Communication

We consider a set of cellular users associated with base station (BS) in network that employs Device-to-device (D2D) communication. A subset the request for some files from server BS. Now, can potentially act as relays and forward requested files, or partitions BS to requesting (destination nodes) over D2D links. However, this requires cooperation among users. Also, when cooperate each other, total amount energy consumed transferring destination nodes usually be considerably reduced compared case user separately downloads file it needs In paper, we seek conditions under which have an incentive other. To end, model above scenario using frameworks cooperative game theory stable coalitional games. two different models transfer within coalition: (i) Model A, split into multiple send these relays, multicast coalition, (ii) B, file, sends entire single relay, multicasts coalition. First, explore question whether is beneficial all cooperate, i.e., grand coalition stable. For use solution concept core theory. show that, general, may empty core, not possible stabilize Next, provide 1) always non-empty 2) \mathbb D c -stable partition exists. problem assigning so maximize sum utilities NP-Complete. Finally, numerical computations, evaluate consumption no cases performance heuristics solving B.