Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application
We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers to bridge a gap between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. Theoretical results include the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and the characterization of the grand-coalition SSPE as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, provided that it lies in the core. We also prov...
متن کاملCoalitional Bargaining with Markovian Proposers
The paper generalizes coalitional bargaining of the Baron-Ferejohn type (Eraslan and McLennan, 2006) to non-independent proposers. Widening the scope of possible proposer dynamics significantly, this allows for likely continued offers, alternating offers (Calvó-Armengol, 2001b), and deterministic dynamics such as clockwise rotation of proposers (Herrero, 1985). Existence of stationary subgame p...
متن کاملNoncooperative Coalitional Bargaining with Partition-Based Selection of Proposers∗
This paper presents a noncooperative dynamic n-player coalitional bargaining game with transferable utilities, which includes Chatterjee et al.’s (1993) fixed-order-proposer model and Okada’s (1996) random-proposer model as two extreme special cases. In this model, proposers are selected by protocols based on partitions of player sets. This paper provides conditions for the subgame efficiency, ...
متن کاملNoncooperative Coalitional Bargaining with Generalized Selection of Proposers∗
This paper presents a noncooperative coalitional bargaining model with generalized selection of proposers, which includes Chatterjee et al.’s (1993) fixed-order-proposer model and Okada’s (1996) random-proposer model as two extreme special cases. In the model, at each round, proposers are selected according to recognition probabilities, which depend on who rejects a proposal at the previous rou...
متن کاملRational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by constructing an implementation mechanism. Th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.008