Coalition formation in general NTU games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players. By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players’ preferences over coalitions which we use to define a coalition formation game. We focus on strongly mon...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s100580000016