Coalition formation: a game-theoretic analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coalition formation: a game-theoretic analysis
There are many examples of individuals forming coalitions to obtain or protect a valuable resource. We present an analytical model of coalition formation in which individuals seek alliances if they judge themselves too weak to secure the resource alone. We allow coalition seeking to carry an investment cost (h) and let contest outcomes depend probabilistically on the relative fighting strengths...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Behavioral Ecology
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1465-7279,1045-2249
DOI: 10.1093/beheco/arl084