COALITION BARGAINING IN REPEATED GAMES

Bargaining and Repeated Games

Bargaining power in repeated games

In this paper, we propose a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, selection-consistent perfect equilibrium. This concept reflects the idea that players may not expect future bargaining power to be correlated with bygone actions. The equilibrium payoff set is generated by equilibria with a simple recursive structure. When discounting tends to zero, ...

Coalition Bargaining Games: Local and Global Uniqueness of Equilibria

This paper studies generic properties of Markov Perfect equilibrium of coalitional bargaining games. We show that in almost all games (except in a set of measure zero of the parameter space) the equilibrium is locally unique and stable, and comparative statics analysis are welldefined and can be performed using standard calculus tools. Global uniqueness does not hold in general, but the number ...

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts1

Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and o¤ers each period and collect payo¤s (as function of that period’s actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an in…nitely-repeated game wherein players can o¤er one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent regarding how the sur...

To “ a Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Bargaining ”

THEOREM 9: For each i, let a be a pure action profile in the stage game. If aii is a best response to ai−i for both i and (π2 −π1) · (u(a2)− u(a1)) > 0, then the following two-state automaton strategy, with states 1 and 2, yields a BSG set for δ sufficiently high: • Disagreement: In state i, make no transfers and play a in the action phase. If player j = i deviates unilaterally, go to state j; ...