Coalition agreement and party mandate: How coalition agreements constrain the ministers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Binding Agreements II: Coalition Formation
The bargaining approach can be usefully applied to address some classical questions in cooperative game theory. One of these concerns the formation of coalitions and the writing of binding agreements among groups of players. Many years ago, Ronald Coase argued that such negotiations would invariably end in an efficient outcome, and that bargaining power — whatever that is — would be reflected i...
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We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are history dependent—must converge to effici...
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متن کاملPotential, coalition formation and coalition structure∗
The present paper studies a new potential function of a cooperative game with a coalition structure. When define a marginal contribution of each player, a notion of a coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983) is considered. Our potential is a real-valued function in contrast to Winter (1992)’s one which is vector-valued function whose dimension is the number of elements in the coalition struc...
متن کاملSupplementary Notes for “Coalition Formation With Binding Agreements”
In these notes we provide some supplementary results and discussion not included in the main text of the paper. In particular, we provide a proof of the existence of a Markovian equilibrium, the proof of Proposition 3, some examples for three-player games and further discussion of the efficiency result. We also provide the proof of the four player inefficiency example and construct an equilibri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Party Politics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1354-0688,1460-3683
DOI: 10.1177/1354068810372099