منابع مشابه
Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V −Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model’s main qualitative predictions: competit...
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With game play data, empirical approaches to clustering are typically based solely on game outcomes, e.g. kills, deaths, and score for each player. In this paper, we investigate a method for clustering players based on how a player’s choices relate to outcomes, or equivalently the latent player styles exhibited by players. Our approach is based on a Bayesian semi-parametric clustering method wh...
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We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg–Tirole’s preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader’s optimization problem has an interior solution, the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolis...
متن کاملPotential competition in preemption games
We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players’ moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each...
متن کاملPotential Competitors in Preemption Games∗
The purpose of this paper is to study the adoption of a new technology by a firm when the competitor comes into play at a random date that can be seen as her birth date. The presence of a competitor is thus only revealed when she invests. We show that there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium that can be split into three stages. No firm will invest before a threshold T ∗ 1 even if she is born ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12054