منابع مشابه
Climate Coalitions in an Integrated Assessment Model
An analytically tractable approximation of a numerical model is used to investigate coalition formation between nine major world regions with regard to their policies for greenhouse gas emission reduction. Full cooperation is not individually rational. Assuming non-transferable utility, side payments do not ensure full cooperation either. Without side payments, the largest stable coalitions are...
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This paper evaluates with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. To this effect it uses an the integrated assessment CWS model. After a reminder of the two game theoretical stability notions involved – namely, core-stability and internal-external stability – and...
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In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. In a game of endogenous coalition formation, I show that voting blocs form in equilibrium, and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to join a bloc...
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We analyze a situation where individuals and coalitions can obtain effective property rights over a resource by means of an exclusion contest. Coalitions face a trade-off when they decide to incorporate new members: Big groups control the resource more likely but individual property rights are more diluted. Under cooperative explotation of the resource the grand coalition is the efficient parti...
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In many multiagent scenarios, groups of participants (known as coalitions) may attempt to cooperate, seeking to increase the benefits realized by the members. Depending on the scenario, such cooperation may be benign, or may be unwelcome or even forbidden (often called collusion). Coalitions can present a problem for many multiagent systems, potentially undermining the intended operation of sys...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.72014