Clear Persuasion

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Costly Persuasion

In many settings of economic interest, information is ex ante symmetric, but one agent designs the informational environment—i.e., controls what additional information will be generated. A number of recent papers study such situations, with applications including Internet advertising (Rayo and Segal 2010), communication in organizations (Jehiel 2013), bank regulation (Gick and Pausch 2012; Gold...

متن کامل

Bayesian Persuasion

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a ...

متن کامل

Bayesian Persuasion

2590 Suppose one person, call him Sender, wishes to persuade another, call her Receiver, to change her action. If Receiver is a rational Bayesian, can Sender persuade her to take an action he would prefer over the action she was originally going to take? If Receiver understands that Sender chose what information to convey with the intent of manipulating her action for his own benefit, can Sende...

متن کامل

Persuasion dynamics

We here discuss a model of continuous opinion dynamics in which agents adjust continuous opinions as a result of random binary encounters whenever their difference in opinion is below a given threshold. We concentrate on the version of the model in the presence of few extremists which might drive the dynamics to generalized extremism. A network version of the dynamics is presented here, and its...

متن کامل

Ambiguous Persuasion ∗

We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, Sender might choose to use ambiguous communication devices. The main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We character...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Perfusion

سال: 2018

ISSN: 0267-6591,1477-111X

DOI: 10.1177/0267659118770317