Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else

We extend the existing literature on gender differences in competitive behavior by investigating tournament entry choices when a principal decides for an agent. In laboratory experiment, we randomly assign subjects role of either or The whether agent performs real-effort task under piece-rate incentives. When deciding, is informed about agent’s previous performance, age, and residency. Between treatments, vary knows gender. baseline treatment, replicate standard setting which decide themselves to compete. Our main findings are, first, that there no gap principals agents as opposed treatment. Second, closes because more women are made compete principals. Third, whereas revealing associated with higher overall rates. Exploratory analyses principals’ choice determinants reveal positive effect preferences take risks, competitiveness, confidence agents’ performances making addition, find difference how evaluate male female performances. Finally, test efficiency competition show they lead fewer payoff-maximizing outcomes than themselves. Additionally, winners’ lower compete, but this not robust controlling This paper was accepted Yan Chen, behavioral economics decision analysis. Funding: work supported L. Meltzers Høyskolefond; Austrian Science Fund [Grant SFB F63 “Credence Goods, Incentives Behavior”], Department Economics at University Bergen. Also, grateful funding from Equal Opportunity Coordination Office Regensburg its faculty Business Economics. Supplemental Material: supplementary online material data available https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413 .