Choice, Rationality, and Substance Dependence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement
We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Unlike the standard economic theory of revealed preference, our method is can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. Paralleling the standard theory we present a model for choice such that the observations arise "as if" they were the result of a speci c decision making process. ...
متن کاملCollective Rationality and Social Choice
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if a collective choice rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for a collective choice rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective...
متن کاملChoice , internal consistency , and rationality
Choice, internal consistency, and rationality* Aditi Bhattacharyya Telephone: (951) 970 3431; E-mail: [email protected] Prasanta K. Pattanaik Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, U.S.A. Telephone: (951) 789 7265; Fax: (951) 789 7265; E-mail: [email protected] Yongsheng Xu Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georg...
متن کاملIndividual Rationality in Collective Choice
This paper studies the rationality of an individual player in sequential games of perfect information played with other players who are not necessarily rational. The paper proposes a set of properties on the choice behavior and shows that they are equivalent to the rationality of an individual player at the initial node independently of the behavioral norm of the other players. Furthermore, I s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Bioethics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1536-0075,1526-5161
DOI: 10.1162/152651602317533776