Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interaction Transform of Set Functions over a Finite Set
The paper introduces a new transform of set functions over a finite set, which is linear and invertible as the well known Möbius transform in combinatorics. This transform leads to the interaction index, a central concept in multicriteria decision making. The interaction index of a singleton happens to be the Shapley value of the set function or, in terms of cooperative game theory, of the valu...
متن کاملInteraction transform for bi-set functions over a finite set
Set functions appear as a useful tool in many areas of decision making and operations research, and several linear invertible transformations have been introduced for set functions, such as the Möbius transform and the interaction transform. The present paper establish similar transforms and their relationships for bi-set functions, i.e. functions of two disjoint subsets. Bi-set functions have ...
متن کاملIterating Random Functions on a Finite Set
Choose random functions f1, f2, f3, . . . independently and uniformly from among the nn functions from [n] into [n]. For t > 1, let gt = ft ◦ ft−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 be the composition of the first t functions, and let T be the smallest t for which gt is constant(i.e. gt(i) = gt(j) for all i, j). The goal of this paper is to determine the asymptotic distribution of T . We prove that, for any positive...
متن کاملA Finite Set of Discrete Functions
Wolpert and Macready’s No Free Lunch theorem proves that no search algorithm is better than any other over all possible discrete functions. The meaning of the No Free Lunch theorem has, however, been the subject of intense debate. We prove that for local neighborhood search on problems of bounded complexity, where complexity is measured in terms of number of basins of attraction in the search s...
متن کاملBargaining over a finite set of alternatives
We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/bf00437315