منابع مشابه
Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders’observations gets small. In the case of replacement noise, where the senders observe the true state with high probability, we show this under mild assumption...
متن کاملCheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment
In this paper we experimentally test strategic information transmission between one informed and two uninformed agents in a cheap-talk game. We find evidence of the "disciplining" effect of public communication as compared to private; however, it is much weaker than predicted by the theory. Adding a second receiver naturally increases the complexity of strategic thinking when communication is p...
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We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm (the sender) is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants (the receivers). Although our experimental data reveals that senders’ messages convey truthful information and this is picked up by the receivers, this overcommunication (relative to standard theoret...
متن کاملCheap Talk with Two Audiences
When an informed party can engage in cheap talk with more than one audience, we show how the presence of one audience may either discipline or subvert the speaker's relationship with the other audience. We ask how welfare is affected by public or private disclosure, and predict how much communication will take place. Keyvt^ords. cheap talk, signaling, communication, incentives. Cheap Talk with ...
متن کاملReputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2196-1085,2196-1093
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0076-6